This is a list of published and forthcoming manuscripts. The list is organized by date of publication, but can be sorted thematically using the tags. Some publications include links with replication materials and appendices; if you cannot find such a link, please send me an email with your request.
Gubernatorial Effects on the Voting Behavior of National Legislators
G. Rosas and J. Langston, “Gubernatorial Effects on the Voting Behavior of National Legislators”, Journal of Politics, 73 (2), 2011. Are subnational political elites, such as governors, capable of affecting the voting behavior of national representatives even in the face of high legislative discipline? We address this question by estimating the exogenous causal effect of gubernatorial […]
The Misiones of the Chavez Government in Venezuela
K. Hawkins, G. Rosas and M. Johnson, “The Misiones of the Chavez Government in Venezuela”, in D. Hellinger and D. Smilde (eds), Bottom Up or Top Down? Participation and Clientelism in Venezuela’s Bolivarian Democracy, Duke University Press, 2011.
Vote-Seeking Incentives and Investment Environments
B. Crisp, N. Jensen, G. Rosas, and T. Zeitzoff, “Vote-Seeking Incentives and Investment Environments: The Need for Credit Claiming and the Provision of Protectionism”, Electoral Studies, 29 (2), 2010. Incentives to cultivate a personal reputation encourage legislators to generate policy outcomes for which they can claim credit. We show that these incentives make themselves felt in […]
Latin American Party Systems
H. Kitschelt, K. Hawkins, J.P. Luna, G. Rosas and E. Zechmeister, Latin American Party Systems, Cambridge University Press, 2010.
Trust in Elections and the Institutional Design of Electoral Authorities
G. Rosas, “Trust in Elections and the Institutional Design of Electoral Authorities: Evidence from Latin America”, Electoral Studies, 29 (1), 2010. It is often assumed that the institutional organization of electoral management bodies (EMB) has an impact on the credibility of elections, but this proposition has been difficult to verify empirically. I examine whether the degree […]
Curbing Bailouts. Bank Crises and Democratic Accountability in Comparative Perspective
G. Rosas, Curbing Bailouts. Bank Crises and Democratic Accountability in Comparative Perspective, University of Michigan Press, 2009.
After the Storm: The Long Run Impact of Bank Bailouts
G. Rosas and N. Jensen, “After the Storm: The Long Run Impact of Bank Bailouts”, in R.E. Wright (ed.), Bailouts: Public Money, Private Profit, Columbia University Press, 2009.
Non-Ignorable Abstentions in Mexico’s Instituto Federal Electoral
G. Rosas and Y. Shomer, “Non-Ignorable Abstentions in Mexico’s Instituto Federal Electoral“, in E. Aragonés, C. Beviá, H. Llavador, and N. Schofield (eds.), The Political Economy of Democracy, Fundación BBVA, 2009.
Dynamic Latent Trait Models
G. Rosas, “Dynamic Latent Trait Models: An Application to Latin American Banking Crises”, Electoral Studies, 28 (special symposium on Measurement Methods for Better Longitudinal Modelling), 2009. Dynamic latent trait models combine information from a variety of manifest variables, possibly measured on different scales, that are presumed to be indicators of an unobserved latent phenomenon, while allowing […]
Partisanship in Non-Partisan Electoral Agencies and Democratic Compliance
F. Estevez, E. Magar and G. Rosas, “Partisanship in Non-Partisan Electoral Agencies and Democratic Compliance: Evidence from Mexico’s Federal Electoral Institute”, Electoral Studies, 27 (2), 2008. Scholars argue that electoral management bodies staffed by autonomous, non-partisan experts are best for producing credible and fair elections. We inspect the voting record of Mexico’s Instituto Federal Electoral (IFE), an ostensibly […]
Models of Nonresponse in Legislative Politics
G. Rosas and Y. Shomer, “Models of Nonresponse in Legislative Politics”, Legislative Studies Quarterly, 33 (4), 2008. Tools dedicated to inferring the ideological leanings of legislators from observed votes — techniques such as NOMINATE (Poole and Rosenthal 1997) or the item-response-theory model of Clinton, Jackman, and Rivers (2004) — rest on the assumption that the political […]
The Political Economy of Budget Deficits
L. Leachman, G. Rosas, P. Lange and A. Bester, “The Political Economy of Budget Deficits”, Economics and Politics, 19 (3), 2007. In Leachman et al. (2005) we use the multicointegration approach to test for sustainable fiscal budgeting processes in a stochastic setting in 15 industrialized countries. In this paper, we extend the analysis in order to […]