A. Crespo-Tenorio, N. Jensen, G. Rosas, “Political Liabilities: Surviving Banking Crises”, Comparative Political Studies, 47(7), 1047-1074. Little is known about the political repercussions of banking crises despite the extensive literature on the link between economic performance and political outcomes. We develop a theory of how clarity of responsibility affects incumbent party survival patterns in 89 democracies […]
Category: Banking Crises
When Do Autonomous Banking Regulators Promote Stability?
J. Jordana and G. Rosas, “When Do Autonomous Banking Regulators Promote Stability?”, European Journal of Political Research, 53(4), 2014. Can autonomous banking regulatory agencies reduce the odds that a country will suffer a crippling banking crisis? We investigate the impact that agencies charged with banking regulation and prudential supervision can have on financial stability in the […]
Curbing Bailouts. Bank Crises and Democratic Accountability in Comparative Perspective
G. Rosas, Curbing Bailouts. Bank Crises and Democratic Accountability in Comparative Perspective, University of Michigan Press, 2009.
Dynamic Latent Trait Models
G. Rosas, “Dynamic Latent Trait Models: An Application to Latin American Banking Crises”, Electoral Studies, 28 (special symposium on Measurement Methods for Better Longitudinal Modelling), 2009. Dynamic latent trait models combine information from a variety of manifest variables, possibly measured on different scales, that are presumed to be indicators of an unobserved latent phenomenon, while allowing […]
Bagehot or Bailout? An Analysis of Government Responses to Banking Crises
G. Rosas, “Bagehot or Bailout? An Analysis of Government Responses to Banking Crises”, American Journal of Political Science, 50 (1), 2006. Political intervention into markets can take a nearly endless number of forms. During the latter part of the twentieth century, there was a widely shared sense that governments should decrease their role in the economy. […]