A. Crespo-Tenorio, N. Jensen, G. Rosas, “Political Liabilities: Surviving Banking Crises”, Comparative Political Studies, 47(7), 1047-1074. Little is known about the political repercussions of banking crises despite the extensive literature on the link between economic performance and political outcomes. We develop a theory of how clarity of responsibility affects incumbent party survival patterns in 89 democracies […]
J. Jordana and G. Rosas, “When Do Autonomous Banking Regulators Promote Stability?”, European Journal of Political Research, 53(4), 2014. Can autonomous banking regulatory agencies reduce the odds that a country will suffer a crippling banking crisis? We investigate the impact that agencies charged with banking regulation and prudential supervision can have on financial stability in the […]
G. Rosas, Curbing Bailouts. Bank Crises and Democratic Accountability in Comparative Perspective, University of Michigan Press, 2009.
G. Rosas, “Dynamic Latent Trait Models: An Application to Latin American Banking Crises”, Electoral Studies, 28 (special symposium on Measurement Methods for Better Longitudinal Modelling), 2009. Dynamic latent trait models combine information from a variety of manifest variables, possibly measured on different scales, that are presumed to be indicators of an unobserved latent phenomenon, while allowing […]
G. Rosas, “Bagehot or Bailout? An Analysis of Government Responses to Banking Crises”, American Journal of Political Science, 50 (1), 2006. Political intervention into markets can take a nearly endless number of forms. During the latter part of the twentieth century, there was a widely shared sense that governments should decrease their role in the economy. […]