Reassessing the Trade-off Hypothesis

G. Rosas and L. Manzetti, “Reassessing the Trade-off Hypothesis: How Misery Drives the Corruption Effect on Presidential Approval”, Electoral Studies, 39, 2015. Do economic conditions drive voters to punish politicians that tolerate corruption? Previous scholarly work contends that citizens in young democracies support corrupt governments that are capable of promoting good economic outcomes, the so-called trade-off […]

The Misiones of the Chavez Government in Venezuela

K. Hawkins, G. Rosas and M. Johnson, “The Misiones of the Chavez Government in Venezuela”, in D. Hellinger and D. Smilde (eds), Bottom Up or Top Down? Participation and Clientelism in Venezuela’s Bolivarian Democracy, Duke University Press, 2011.

Latin American Party Systems

H. Kitschelt, K. Hawkins, J.P. Luna, G. Rosas and E. Zechmeister, Latin American Party Systems, Cambridge University Press, 2010.  

Trust in Elections and the Institutional Design of Electoral Authorities

G. Rosas, “Trust in Elections and the Institutional Design of Electoral Authorities: Evidence from Latin America”, Electoral Studies, 29 (1), 2010. It is often assumed that the institutional organization of electoral management bodies (EMB) has an impact on the credibility of elections, but this proposition has been difficult to verify empirically. I examine whether the degree […]

Dynamic Latent Trait Models

G. Rosas, “Dynamic Latent Trait Models: An Application to Latin American Banking Crises”, Electoral Studies, 28 (special symposium on Measurement Methods for Better Longitudinal Modelling), 2009. Dynamic latent trait models combine information from a variety of manifest variables, possibly measured on different scales, that are presumed to be indicators of an unobserved latent phenomenon, while allowing […]

Models of Nonresponse in Legislative Politics

G. Rosas and Y. Shomer, “Models of Nonresponse in Legislative Politics”, Legislative Studies Quarterly, 33 (4), 2008. Tools dedicated to inferring the ideological leanings of legislators from observed votes — techniques such as NOMINATE (Poole and Rosenthal 1997) or the item-response-theory model of Clinton, Jackman, and Rivers (2004) — rest on the assumption that the political […]

The Ideological Organization of Latin American Legislative Parties

G. Rosas, “The Ideological Organization of Latin American Legislative Parties. An Empirical Analysis of Elite Policy Preferences”, Comparative Political Studies, 38 (7), 2005. Are legislative party systems in Latin America organized along ideological lines? This article presents a cross-country analysis of legislators’ positions on a variety of issues, such as government intervention in the economy, the […]