This is a list of published and forthcoming manuscripts. The list is organized by date of publication, but can be sorted thematically using the tags. Some publications include links with replication materials and appendices; if you cannot find such a link, please send me an email with your request.


Open for Politics? Economic Globalization and Political Survival

N. Jensen and G. Rosas, "Open for Politics? Economic Globalization and Political Survival", Journal of Experiments in Political Science, forthcoming. Previous literature suggests that economic performance affects government approval asymmetrically, either because voters are quicker to blame incompetence than to credit ability (grievance asymmetry) or because they understand that the degree to which policy-makers can affect […]

Jumping Ship or Jumping on the Bandwagon: When Do Local Politicians Support National Candidates?

G. Rosas and A. Lucardi, "Jumping Ship or Jumping on the Bandwagon: When Do Local Politicians Support National Candidates?", Political Science Research and Methods, forthcoming. Local politicians are often expected to mobilize voters on behalf of copartisan candidates for national office. Yet this requirement is difficult to enforce because the effort of local politicians cannot be […]

On Board with Banks: Do Banking Connections Help Politicians Win Elections?

J. Markgraf and G. Rosas, "On Board with Banks: Do Banking Connections Help Politicians Win Elections?", Journal of Politics, forthcoming. Do politicians benefit electorally from connections to banks? Recent research illuminates how banks benefit from political connections, yet we do not know much about the impact of bank connections on a politician's reelection chances. We consider […]

Risky Business: Where Do Presidential Campaigns Visit?

J. Langston and G. Rosas, "Risky Business: Where do Presidential Campaigns Visit?", Electoral Studies, 55, 2018. We build on existing theories about why presidential candidates organize rallies to understand where they are likely to organize them. We conjecture that the possibility of a failed rally is an important factor driving these choices. When a candidate is […]

Is the Incumbent Curse the Incumbent’s Fault?

A. Lucardi and G. Rosas, "Is the Incumbent Curse the Incumbent’s Fault? Strategic Behavior and Negative Incumbency Effects in Young Democracies", Electoral Studies, 44, 2016. Why are incumbents in young democracies cursed? The most convincing explanation emphasizes the role of rent-seeking on the part of politicians, which induces voters to throw them out of office before […]

Reassessing the Trade-off Hypothesis

G. Rosas and L. Manzetti, "Reassessing the Trade-off Hypothesis: How Misery Drives the Corruption Effect on Presidential Approval", Electoral Studies, 39, 2015. Do economic conditions drive voters to punish politicians that tolerate corruption? Previous scholarly work contends that citizens in young democracies support corrupt governments that are capable of promoting good economic outcomes, the so-called trade-off […]

No News is News: Non-Ignorable Non-Response in Roll-Call Data Analysis

G. Rosas, Y. Shomer, S. Haptonstahl, "No News is News: Non-Ignorable Non-Response in Roll-Call Data Analysis", American Journal of Political Science, 59(2), 2015. Roll-call votes are widely employed to infer the ideological proclivities of legislators. However, many roll-call matrices are characterized by high levels of non-response. Under many circumstances, non-response cannot be assumed to be ignorable. […]

Political Liabilities: Surviving Banking Crises

A. Crespo-Tenorio, N. Jensen, G. Rosas, "Political Liabilities: Surviving Banking Crises", Comparative Political Studies, 47(7), 1047-1074. Little is known about the political repercussions of banking crises despite the extensive literature on the link between economic performance and political outcomes. We develop a theory of how clarity of responsibility affects incumbent party survival patterns in 89 democracies […]

Local Public Goods as Vote-Purchasing Devices? Persuasion and Mobilization in the Choice of Clientelist Payments

G. Rosas, N.P. Johnston, K. Hawkins, 2014, "Local Public Goods as Vote-Purchasing Devices? Persuasion and Mobilization in the Choice of Clientelist Systems", Journal of Theoretical Politics, 26(4): 573–598. We consider the behavior of an incumbent that can deploy local public goods and private goods to buy votes, and is unable to verify vote choice but capable […]

When Do Autonomous Banking Regulators Promote Stability?

J. Jordana and G. Rosas, "When Do Autonomous Banking Regulators Promote Stability?", European Journal of Political Research, 53(4), 2014. Can autonomous banking regulatory agencies reduce the odds that a country will suffer a crippling banking crisis? We investigate the impact that agencies charged with banking regulation and prudential supervision can have on financial stability in the […]