N. Jensen and G. Rosas, “Open for Politics? Economic Globalization and Political Survival”, Journal of Experiments in Political Science, forthcoming.
Previous literature suggests that economic performance affects government approval asymmetrically, either because voters are quicker to blame incompetence than to credit ability (grievance asymmetry) or because they understand that the degree to which policy-makers can affect the economy varies depending on economic openness (clarity of responsibility asymmetry).
G. Rosas and L. Manzetti, “Reassessing the Trade-off Hypothesis: How Misery Drives the Corruption Effect on Presidential Approval”, Electoral Studies, 39, 2015. Do economic conditions drive voters to punish politicians that tolerate corruption? Previous scholarly work contends that citizens in young democracies support corrupt governments that are capable of promoting good economic outcomes, the so-called trade-off […]
A. Crespo-Tenorio, N. Jensen, G. Rosas, “Political Liabilities: Surviving Banking Crises”, Comparative Political Studies, 47(7), 1047-1074. Little is known about the political repercussions of banking crises despite the extensive literature on the link between economic performance and political outcomes. We develop a theory of how clarity of responsibility affects incumbent party survival patterns in 89 democracies […]
J. Jordana and G. Rosas, “When Do Autonomous Banking Regulators Promote Stability?”, European Journal of Political Research, 53(4), 2014. Can autonomous banking regulatory agencies reduce the odds that a country will suffer a crippling banking crisis? We investigate the impact that agencies charged with banking regulation and prudential supervision can have on financial stability in the […]
B. Crisp, N. Jensen, G. Rosas, and T. Zeitzoff, “Vote-Seeking Incentives and Investment Environments: The Need for Credit Claiming and the Provision of Protectionism”, Electoral Studies, 29 (2), 2010. Incentives to cultivate a personal reputation encourage legislators to generate policy outcomes for which they can claim credit. We show that these incentives make themselves felt in […]
G. Rosas, Curbing Bailouts. Bank Crises and Democratic Accountability in Comparative Perspective, University of Michigan Press, 2009.
G. Rosas and N. Jensen, “After the Storm: The Long Run Impact of Bank Bailouts”, in R.E. Wright (ed.), Bailouts: Public Money, Private Profit, Columbia University Press, 2009.
L. Leachman, G. Rosas, P. Lange and A. Bester, “The Political Economy of Budget Deficits”, Economics and Politics, 19 (3), 2007. In Leachman et al. (2005) we use the multicointegration approach to test for sustainable fiscal budgeting processes in a stochastic setting in 15 industrialized countries. In this paper, we extend the analysis in order to […]
N. Jensen and G. Rosas, “Foreign Direct Investment and Income Inequality in Mexico, 1990-2000”, International Organization, 61, 2007. In this article we explore the relationship between the investments of multinational corporations (foreign direct investment) and income inequality in Mexico. We argue that Mexico’s liberalization of foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows in the 1990s provides a natural […]
G. Rosas, “Bagehot or Bailout? An Analysis of Government Responses to Banking Crises”, American Journal of Political Science, 50 (1), 2006. Political intervention into markets can take a nearly endless number of forms. During the latter part of the twentieth century, there was a widely shared sense that governments should decrease their role in the economy. […]
L. Leachman, A. Bester, G. Rosas, and P. Lange, “Multicointegration and Sustainability of Fiscal Practices”, Economic Inquiry, 43 (2), 2005. Using multicointegration methodology, we develop criteria for testing sustainability of fiscal budgeting processes across all states of nature. Criteria are derived from the optimal control literature where levels and rates of change of a system of […]