Political Liabilities: Surviving Banking Crises

A. Crespo-Tenorio, N. Jensen, G. Rosas, “Political Liabilities: Surviving Banking Crises”, Comparative Political Studies, 47(7), 1047-1074. Little is known about the political repercussions of banking crises despite the extensive literature on the link between economic performance and political outcomes. We develop a theory of how clarity of responsibility affects incumbent party survival patterns in 89 democracies […]

Local Public Goods as Vote-Purchasing Devices? Persuasion and Mobilization in the Choice of Clientelist Payments

G. Rosas, N.P. Johnston, K. Hawkins, 2014, “Local Public Goods as Vote-Purchasing Devices? Persuasion and Mobilization in the Choice of Clientelist Systems”, Journal of Theoretical Politics, 26(4): 573–598. We consider the behavior of an incumbent that can deploy local public goods and private goods to buy votes, and is unable to verify vote choice but capable […]

When Do Autonomous Banking Regulators Promote Stability?

J. Jordana and G. Rosas, “When Do Autonomous Banking Regulators Promote Stability?”, European Journal of Political Research, 53(4), 2014. Can autonomous banking regulatory agencies reduce the odds that a country will suffer a crippling banking crisis? We investigate the impact that agencies charged with banking regulation and prudential supervision can have on financial stability in the […]