Welcome to the website of Matthew McGrath
I am Professor of Philosophy at Washington University in St. Louis. My main area of specialization is epistemology. I also work in the philosophy of perception and metaphysics.
Authored Books
Selected Publications
We Have Positive Epistemic Duties – forthcoming in Nous
Is Suspension of Judgment a Question-Directed Attitude: No, not really – forthcoming in Contemporary Debates in Epistemology, as part of an exchange with Jane Friedman
Nonsubjectivism about How things Seem – forthcoming in Seemings: New Arguments, New Angles, K. McCain and S. Stapleford (Eds), Routledge.
A Limitation on Agency in Judgment – Synthese 2022
Epistemic Norms for Waiting (or Suspension) – Philosophical Topics (2021)
Undercutting Defeat: What it is and Some Implications for Epistemology – OUP volume on Defeaters, Justification and Evidence, ed. by Jessica Brown and Mona Simion (2021)
Being Neutral: Agnosticism, Inquiry and the Suspension of Judgment – Nous (2021)
Clarifying Pragmatic Encroachment – with Jeremy Fantl, Oxford Studies in Epistemology (2019)
Looks and Perceptual Justification – Philosophy and Phenomenological Research (2018)
Knowing What Things Look Like – Philosophical Review (2017)
Two Purposes of Knowledge Attribution – OUP volume (2015)
Having False Reasons – with Juan Comesaña, OUP volume (2014)
Phenomenal Conservatism and Cognitive Penetration, The Bad Basis Counterexamples – Seemings and Justification volume (2013)
Memory and Epistemic Conservatism – Synthese (2007)
Four-Dimensionalism and the Puzzles of Coincidence – Oxford Studies in Metaphysics (2007)
No Objects, No Problem? – Australasian Journal of Philosophy (2005)
Evidence, Pragmatics and Justification – with Jeremy Fantl, Philosophical Review (2002)
Works in Progress
A Problem for Strict Pragmatism
Pragmatism, Evidentialism and Dilemmas – with Juan Comesaña