G. Rosas and A. Lucardi, “Jumping Ship or Jumping on the Bandwagon: When Do Local Politicians Support National Candidates?”, Political Science Research and Methods, forthcoming. Local politicians are often expected to mobilize voters on behalf of copartisan candidates for national office. Yet this requirement is difficult to enforce because the effort of local politicians cannot be […]
Author: pgsmith
On Board with Banks: Do Banking Connections Help Politicians Win Elections?
J. Markgraf and G. Rosas, “On Board with Banks: Do Banking Connections Help Politicians Win Elections?”, Journal of Politics, forthcoming. Do politicians benefit electorally from connections to banks? Recent research illuminates how banks benefit from political connections, yet we do not know much about the impact of bank connections on a politician’s reelection chances. We consider […]
The Chain of Representation. Preferences, Institutions, and Policy across Presidential Systems
B. Crisp, S. Olivella and G. Rosas, The Chain of Representation. Preferences, Institutions, and Policy across Presidential Systems, Cambridge University Press, 2020.
Risky Business: Where Do Presidential Campaigns Visit?
J. Langston and G. Rosas, “Risky Business: Where do Presidential Campaigns Visit?”, Electoral Studies, 55, 2018. We build on existing theories about why presidential candidates organize rallies to understand where they are likely to organize them. We conjecture that the possibility of a failed rally is an important factor driving these choices. When a candidate is […]
Is the Incumbent Curse the Incumbent’s Fault?
A. Lucardi and G. Rosas, “Is the Incumbent Curse the Incumbent’s Fault? Strategic Behavior and Negative Incumbency Effects in Young Democracies”, Electoral Studies, 44, 2016. Why are incumbents in young democracies cursed? The most convincing explanation emphasizes the role of rent-seeking on the part of politicians, which induces voters to throw them out of office before […]
Reassessing the Trade-off Hypothesis
G. Rosas and L. Manzetti, “Reassessing the Trade-off Hypothesis: How Misery Drives the Corruption Effect on Presidential Approval”, Electoral Studies, 39, 2015. Do economic conditions drive voters to punish politicians that tolerate corruption? Previous scholarly work contends that citizens in young democracies support corrupt governments that are capable of promoting good economic outcomes, the so-called trade-off […]
No News is News: Non-Ignorable Non-Response in Roll-Call Data Analysis
G. Rosas, Y. Shomer, S. Haptonstahl, “No News is News: Non-Ignorable Non-Response in Roll-Call Data Analysis”, American Journal of Political Science, 59(2), 2015. Roll-call votes are widely employed to infer the ideological proclivities of legislators. However, many roll-call matrices are characterized by high levels of non-response. Under many circumstances, non-response cannot be assumed to be ignorable. […]
Political Liabilities: Surviving Banking Crises
A. Crespo-Tenorio, N. Jensen, G. Rosas, “Political Liabilities: Surviving Banking Crises”, Comparative Political Studies, 47(7), 1047-1074. Little is known about the political repercussions of banking crises despite the extensive literature on the link between economic performance and political outcomes. We develop a theory of how clarity of responsibility affects incumbent party survival patterns in 89 democracies […]
Local Public Goods as Vote-Purchasing Devices? Persuasion and Mobilization in the Choice of Clientelist Payments
G. Rosas, N.P. Johnston, K. Hawkins, 2014, “Local Public Goods as Vote-Purchasing Devices? Persuasion and Mobilization in the Choice of Clientelist Systems”, Journal of Theoretical Politics, 26(4): 573–598. We consider the behavior of an incumbent that can deploy local public goods and private goods to buy votes, and is unable to verify vote choice but capable […]
When Do Autonomous Banking Regulators Promote Stability?
J. Jordana and G. Rosas, “When Do Autonomous Banking Regulators Promote Stability?”, European Journal of Political Research, 53(4), 2014. Can autonomous banking regulatory agencies reduce the odds that a country will suffer a crippling banking crisis? We investigate the impact that agencies charged with banking regulation and prudential supervision can have on financial stability in the […]
Los números de la guerra: ¿error de cálculo político o estadístico?
G. Rosas, “Los números de la guerra: ¿error de cálculo político o estadístico?” Blog de la redacción de Nexos, January 5, 2012. Contrary to the conclusions of analysts that resort to sophisticated “matching” techniques, these estimators do not lead to the unequivocal conclusion that military involvement increases the number of violent deaths in Mexico’s drug war, […]
Gubernatorial Effects on the Voting Behavior of National Legislators
G. Rosas and J. Langston, “Gubernatorial Effects on the Voting Behavior of National Legislators”, Journal of Politics, 73 (2), 2011. Are subnational political elites, such as governors, capable of affecting the voting behavior of national representatives even in the face of high legislative discipline? We address this question by estimating the exogenous causal effect of gubernatorial […]
The Misiones of the Chavez Government in Venezuela
K. Hawkins, G. Rosas and M. Johnson, “The Misiones of the Chavez Government in Venezuela”, in D. Hellinger and D. Smilde (eds), Bottom Up or Top Down? Participation and Clientelism in Venezuela’s Bolivarian Democracy, Duke University Press, 2011.
Vote-Seeking Incentives and Investment Environments
B. Crisp, N. Jensen, G. Rosas, and T. Zeitzoff, “Vote-Seeking Incentives and Investment Environments: The Need for Credit Claiming and the Provision of Protectionism”, Electoral Studies, 29 (2), 2010. Incentives to cultivate a personal reputation encourage legislators to generate policy outcomes for which they can claim credit. We show that these incentives make themselves felt in […]
Latin American Party Systems
H. Kitschelt, K. Hawkins, J.P. Luna, G. Rosas and E. Zechmeister, Latin American Party Systems, Cambridge University Press, 2010.
Trust in Elections and the Institutional Design of Electoral Authorities
G. Rosas, “Trust in Elections and the Institutional Design of Electoral Authorities: Evidence from Latin America”, Electoral Studies, 29 (1), 2010. It is often assumed that the institutional organization of electoral management bodies (EMB) has an impact on the credibility of elections, but this proposition has been difficult to verify empirically. I examine whether the degree […]
Curbing Bailouts. Bank Crises and Democratic Accountability in Comparative Perspective
G. Rosas, Curbing Bailouts. Bank Crises and Democratic Accountability in Comparative Perspective, University of Michigan Press, 2009.
After the Storm: The Long Run Impact of Bank Bailouts
G. Rosas and N. Jensen, “After the Storm: The Long Run Impact of Bank Bailouts”, in R.E. Wright (ed.), Bailouts: Public Money, Private Profit, Columbia University Press, 2009.
Non-Ignorable Abstentions in Mexico’s Instituto Federal Electoral
G. Rosas and Y. Shomer, “Non-Ignorable Abstentions in Mexico’s Instituto Federal Electoral“, in E. Aragonés, C. Beviá, H. Llavador, and N. Schofield (eds.), The Political Economy of Democracy, Fundación BBVA, 2009.
Dynamic Latent Trait Models
G. Rosas, “Dynamic Latent Trait Models: An Application to Latin American Banking Crises”, Electoral Studies, 28 (special symposium on Measurement Methods for Better Longitudinal Modelling), 2009. Dynamic latent trait models combine information from a variety of manifest variables, possibly measured on different scales, that are presumed to be indicators of an unobserved latent phenomenon, while allowing […]
Partisanship in Non-Partisan Electoral Agencies and Democratic Compliance
F. Estevez, E. Magar and G. Rosas, “Partisanship in Non-Partisan Electoral Agencies and Democratic Compliance: Evidence from Mexico’s Federal Electoral Institute”, Electoral Studies, 27 (2), 2008. Scholars argue that electoral management bodies staffed by autonomous, non-partisan experts are best for producing credible and fair elections. We inspect the voting record of Mexico’s Instituto Federal Electoral (IFE), an ostensibly […]
Models of Nonresponse in Legislative Politics
G. Rosas and Y. Shomer, “Models of Nonresponse in Legislative Politics”, Legislative Studies Quarterly, 33 (4), 2008. Tools dedicated to inferring the ideological leanings of legislators from observed votes — techniques such as NOMINATE (Poole and Rosenthal 1997) or the item-response-theory model of Clinton, Jackman, and Rivers (2004) — rest on the assumption that the political […]
The Political Economy of Budget Deficits
L. Leachman, G. Rosas, P. Lange and A. Bester, “The Political Economy of Budget Deficits”, Economics and Politics, 19 (3), 2007. In Leachman et al. (2005) we use the multicointegration approach to test for sustainable fiscal budgeting processes in a stochastic setting in 15 industrialized countries. In this paper, we extend the analysis in order to […]
Foreign Direct Investment and Income Inequality in Mexico, 1990-2000
N. Jensen and G. Rosas, “Foreign Direct Investment and Income Inequality in Mexico, 1990-2000”, International Organization, 61, 2007. In this article we explore the relationship between the investments of multinational corporations (foreign direct investment) and income inequality in Mexico. We argue that Mexico’s liberalization of foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows in the 1990s provides a natural […]
Bagehot or Bailout? An Analysis of Government Responses to Banking Crises
G. Rosas, “Bagehot or Bailout? An Analysis of Government Responses to Banking Crises”, American Journal of Political Science, 50 (1), 2006. Political intervention into markets can take a nearly endless number of forms. During the latter part of the twentieth century, there was a widely shared sense that governments should decrease their role in the economy. […]
Multicointegration and Sustainability of Fiscal Practices
L. Leachman, A. Bester, G. Rosas, and P. Lange, “Multicointegration and Sustainability of Fiscal Practices”, Economic Inquiry, 43 (2), 2005. Using multicointegration methodology, we develop criteria for testing sustainability of fiscal budgeting processes across all states of nature. Criteria are derived from the optimal control literature where levels and rates of change of a system of […]
The Ideological Organization of Latin American Legislative Parties
G. Rosas, “The Ideological Organization of Latin American Legislative Parties. An Empirical Analysis of Elite Policy Preferences”, Comparative Political Studies, 38 (7), 2005. Are legislative party systems in Latin America organized along ideological lines? This article presents a cross-country analysis of legislators’ positions on a variety of issues, such as government intervention in the economy, the […]